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providing performance rankings to employees, even without pecuniary consequences, may directly shape
effort due to the rank's effect on self-image. In a three-year randomized control trial with full-time design
where I vary (i) whether to privately inform employees about their performance rank; and (ii) whether to give
benchmarks, i.e. data on current performance required to be in the top 10%, 25%, and 50%. The salespeople's
compensation is only based on absolute performance via a high-powered commission scheme in which
rankings convey no direct additional financial benefits. There are two important innovations in this
experiment. First, prior to the start of the experiment all salespeople were told their performance ranking.
Second, employees operate in a multi-tasking environment where they can sell multiple brands. There are four
key results: First, removing rank feedback actually increases sales performance by 11%, or 1/10th of a
standard deviation. Second, only men (not women) change their performance. Third, adding benchmarks to
rank feedback significantly raises performance, but it is not significantly different from providing no feedback.
Fourth, as predicted by the multi-tasking model, the treatment effect increases with the scope for effort
substitution across furniture brands as employees switch their effort to other tasks when their rank is worse
than expected.
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Abstract 
Performance rankings are a very common workplace management practice. Behavioral theories suggest 
that providing performance rankings to employees, even without pecuniary consequences, may directly 
shape effort due to the rank’s effect on self-image. In a three-year randomized control trial with full-time 
furniture salespeople (n=1754), I study the effect on sales performance in a two-by-two experimental 
design where I vary (i) whether to privately inform employees about their performance rank; and (ii) 
whether to give benchmarks, i.e. data on the current performance required to be in the top 10%, 25% and 
50%. The salespeople’s compensation is only based on absolute performance via a high-powered 
commission scheme in which rankings convey no direct additional financial benefits. There are two 
important innovations in this experiment. First, prior to the start of the experiment all salespeople were 
told their performance ranking. Second, employees operate in a multi-tasking environment where they 
can sell multiple brands. There are four key results: First, removing rank feedback actually increases sales 
performance by 11%, or 1/10th of a standard deviation. Second, only men (not women) change their 
performance. Third, adding benchmarks to rank feedback significantly raises performance, but it is not 
significantly different from providing no feedback. Fourth, as predicted by the multi-tasking model, the 
treatment effect increases with the scope for effort substitution across furniture brands as employees 
switch their effort to other tasks when their rank is worse than expected. 
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Introduction 
Rankings and league tables, where people are ranked relative to others in terms of a performance 
measure, are a pervasive feature of life. Employers use them to measure employee performance and 
determine bonuses and promotions (Grote, 2005), and more recently the use of rankings is being extended 
to assess the performance of teachers and hospital employees. Beyond the monetary benefits that may go 
along with high rankings, it has also been argued that people may care about their ranking per se, even 
when rankings have no financial consequences, which I refer to as rank incentives, as they directly affect 
self-image (Maslow, 1943, McClelland et al, 1953, Benabou and Tirole, 2006, Koszegi, 2006) and 
convey status (Frank, 1985, Moldovanu et al, 2007, Besley and Ghatak, 2008).  
These rank incentives open up an important cost-effective way to shape performance, given 
recent technological advances that make reporting rankings cheap and easy, as people might be motivated 
to put forth additional effort in order to rise in the rankings as a way to improve their self-image. Yet the 
response to being informed about one’s rank is ambiguous as it can either be motivating or demoralizing. 
I provide novel evidence on the effect of rank feedback using the context of full-time furniture 
salespeople. I have a clean and precise performance measure – sales data at the individual level over the 
span of three years – and in contrast to the laboratory, I study long-term responses to treatments that can 
abstract from transitory effects like learning.  
Studying the impact of rankings on performance is, however, empirically very challenging, as 
several confounds have to be ruled out.  
First, rank feedback has to vary separately from monetary incentives; otherwise, the behavioral 
response to rank feedback can be clouded by its financial aspect. This study deals with this challenge by 
using a natural field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) with contemporaneous control and treatment 
groups where only the presence or absence of rank feedback is being varied, holding constant all 
monetary incentives.  
Second, as is the case in any experiment, people may respond to changes in the environment by 
increasing performance irrespective of the nature of the treatment.1 This effect is compounded in the case 
of rank feedback with learning behavior and experimentation: Telling people their rank induces a concern 
for relative standing, thus adding a new dimension to how they derive utility from their work. The critical 
point here is that as rankings become salient, people need to learn how much effort is required to change 
their rank leading to a transitory rise in performance. For this reason, introducing rank feedback leads to a 
short-term increase in effort, but it does not distinguish between learning about relative ability from rank 
incentives per se. This concern is handled in this paper by the sequence of treatments: Instead of adding, I 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
1 This is referred to as the Hawthorne Effect even though a reexamination of the original Hawthorne data revealed 
no such effect at that site (Levitt and List, 2011). 
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removed rank feedback and then examine outcomes over several years. In the context of this paper, 
furniture salespeople have been told their rank in prior years so that this information is salient and they 
already had ample opportunity to learn how their effort affects their rank. Removing rankings can then 
separate the effect of rank-incentives from learning behavior.  
Third, providing initial rank information affects employees’ perceptions and beliefs about future 
compensation schemes, which by itself can raise performance. When a salesperson receives rank 
feedback, she could believe that the employer can and will link compensation to that rank in the future 
and this gives rise to performance improvements as employees want to signal ability to the employer. In 
this field experiment I distinguish rank incentives from this signaling effect by having two competing 
treatments: one with rank feedback and another that also induces the signaling mechanism without 
explicit rank feedback.  This is implemented by a treatment arm where employees are given only 
benchmarks showing the current performance needed to be in the top 10%, 25%, and 50% of the sales 
distribution, allowing me to compare the effect of these benchmarks to rank incentives. I find that rank 
matters beyond the signaling mechanism as the rank feedback treatment lead to a larger treatment 
response compared to the benchmark treatment. I further corroborate the evidence with survey data 
revealing that for these employees rankings are more importantly used to shape self-image rather than to 
improve their chances for promotion on the external job market. 
Fourth, tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) predicts that employees might be affected 
by rank information not because they care about relative performance, but because rank data allows them 
to filter out the effect of common shocks to their productivity, enabling them to learn about current 
market conditions, and thus their current return to effort. Several results in my context make this 
mechanism less likely in my context as there are heterogeneous treatment effects, notably by the type of 
feedback and by gender, not predicted by tournament theory. Moreover my survey data confirms that 
employees are least likely to use rankings to learn about current market conditions. 
Fifth, multi-tasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987, Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) is a 
pervasive element of most jobs, as employees have some leeway in terms of how much attention they 
allocate across their various duties in addition to the trade-off between work and the satisfaction they can 
achieve outside the job. Multi-tasking is particularly relevant when people care about their rank yet can 
choose on which task they want to excel to improve their self-image. When the effort required to rank 
well in one task is too high, an employee might be better off pursuing a higher placement in the rankings 
of another task. This multi-tasking aspect in the response to rank incentives has not been addressed in the 
literature so far. This study can shed light on that phenomenon by testing a direct implication of the multi-
tasking model. The multi-tasking problem is driven by how much the costs of effort are connected across 
tasks: Unless tasks are technologically independent, raising effort on one task raises the cost of effort on 
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the other. This so-called effort substitution problem has testable implications and I find, as predicted, that 
rank feedback has a stronger effect on those products with a high effort substitution parameter especially 
when the rank is lower than expected.  
Sixth, the reaction to rank feedback could depend on how actionable the data is. When a furniture 
salesperson is told only that her rank is worse than expected, without telling her how much more she 
needs to sell to achieve a desired rank, she is more inclined to be demoralized and to shift her attention to 
other tasks. However, providing data not only on rank but also on how much additional performance is 
needed to rise in the rankings dampens this demoralization effect. This mechanism, also known as the 
path-goal model (House, 1971, 1996), improves motivation as it makes the connection between effort and 
reward clearer. A novelty of my study is to explore this directly by comparing rank feedback to another 
treatment where, in addition to rank feedback, salespeople are also told the current required sales 
performance necessary to place within the top 10%, 25%, and 50%. 
Finally, another aspect to consider is that the taste for rank incentives and thus the behavioral 
response to rank feedback may be heterogeneous across people as some may care more about their rank 
than others. A natural place to explore this is to look at effects by gender. There is now a rich literature on 
gender differences in the response to incentives and competition (Bertrand, 2010, Gneezy, Niederle and 
Rustichini, 2003, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Gneezy, List and Ludwig, 2009), which could be one 
reason for the persistent gender gap in compensation (Bertrand, 2010).2 In line with gender differences in 
competition I find that rank incentives only affect men but not women adding a new result to literature on 
the gender gap. Empirically the challenge is to tease apart the gender effect from other characteristics that 
may be correlated with gender and workplace productivity, which here I can address with detailed survey 
and productivity data.  
The context of the field experiment was a large office furniture company in North America 
between 2009 and 2011. The multi-tasking setting arises as the sales of these furniture products are 
outsourced to independent dealerships. Those selling the company’s furniture products also can sell other 
products as long as they are not from a pre-specified list of competing brands. Salespeople are located in 
dealerships throughout the country. Their compensation is commission-based and depends on the value of 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
2 In addition to gender differences in the response to incentives (Gneezy et al, 2009, Gneezy et al., 2003; Lavy, 
2008, Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, Bertrand, 2010), other reasons for the gender gap lie in differences in human 
capital (Blau and Kahn, 2010), stereotypes and discrimination (Spencer et al., 1999, Goldin and Rouse, 2000), and 
differences in preferences and identity (Bertrand, 2010). A recent field experiment by Flory et al. (2010), which tests 
for gender differences in job-entry decisions, shows that women disproportionately shy away from competitive work 
settings, yet the effect weakens when the job requires team work and, as in Gunther et al (2010), whether the task is 
female-oriented. Gill and Prowse (2010) find that the gender difference has to do with how men and women react to 
losses and the size of losses in tournaments. Men tend to respond particularly to large losses whereas women’s 
response does not depend on the size of the loss. Cotton et al. (2010) find in an experiment using math competitions 
that gender differences only exist at the first experimental round of competitions and that it is absent in any 
subsequent periods. 
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their sales alone. Both before and during the experiment, all salespeople had access to a personalized and 
password-protected Website, which recorded their sales. The Website is updated daily and shows their 
commission rates and current payout. Historically, and prior to the experiment, all salespeople could view 
on their Webpage their performance rank in terms of year-to-date sales in North America. 
In collaboration with the management of the furniture company, starting in 2009 I implemented a 
two-by-two randomized control trial with four treatment groups: (i) Employees in group one received no 
relative performance feedback; (ii) Employees in group two received rank feedback alone; they were 
privately only told their own rank; (iii) Employees in group three were given benchmarks informing them 
about the current sales-performance required to be in the top 10%, top 25%, and top 50%; and iv) 
Employees in group four were given rank feedback and benchmarks together.  
Statistical power is of concern here as the variance in the sales performance across salespeople 
and months is very large. Furthermore after the pilot phase, I planned also to look at treatment by gender 
as well. For that reason, I spread the treatments over several years. After an initial pilot phase in 2009 
with one treatment group with rank and another group without rank feedback, I had in 2010 one treatment 
group without rank feedback, another with rank feedback, and a third with rank feedback and benchmarks 
and finally in 2011 there was one treatment group without feedback, another with benchmarks only, and a 
third with rank feedback and benchmarks. To achieve balanced treatment groups across years, all 
salespeople were re-randomized to treatment groups at the beginning of year 2010 and 2011. 
The field experiment yielded the following key results.  First, I find that removing rank feedback 
increases sales-performance by 11% or one-tenth of a standard deviation. Second, I find some 
heterogeneity in the effects in that only men, but not women, exhibit a significant treatment response to 
rank feedback. Third, making feedback more actionable by adding benchmarks to rank feedback 
significantly raises performance compared to giving rank feedback alone, but this is not significantly 
different from the effect of not providing any relative performance feedback. Fourth, the result is driven 
by a demoralization effect as salespeople reduce their effort when they are informed of a lower than 
expected rank. Fifth, in line with a theoretical prediction of the multi-tasking model, there is evidence that 
the treatment effect is larger for those sales with high effort substitution across brands, i.e. when the effort 
to sell one brand raises the cost of effort to sell other brands, as salespeople switch to selling other brands 
especially when their rank is worse than expected. 
 
Related Literature 
Building on insights in sociology and social psychology (Festinger, 1954), there is now a rich theory in 
economics on the role of self-image (Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Koszegi, 2006), social status (e.g. 
Robson, 1992, Becker et al, 2005, Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2007, Frey, 2007, Moldovanu, et al, 2007, 
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Auriol and Renault, 2008, Besley and Ghatak, 2008, Dur, 2009, Ederer and Patacconi, 2010), equity 
theory (Adams, 1965) and identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005), which provide the underpinnings to this 
study.3 More generally, a meta-analysis of psychology studies by Kluger and Denisi (1996) about 
feedback interventions, covering some 131 studies with over 13,000 subjects, revealed that the effect of 
feedback on performance is heterogeneous. Even though feedback across the studies improved 
performance on average, it reduced performance in one-third of the surveyed studies. 4 
There are now a number of papers that study the effect of rank feedback with field, laboratory, 
and quasi-experiments. I will focus on a few that are most closely related to mine.5  
In a notable field experiment, Delfgaauw et al. (2012) collaborated with a Dutch retail chain and 
128 of its stores to vary incentive pay and rank feedback based on store-level performance. Employees in 
each store are paid hourly with the store manager also receiving some performance-related pay. Prior to 
the start of the experiment, the stores received no rank feedback about store level sales performance. The 
researchers put stores into groups of five similarly performing outlets and implemented two treatments. In 
the first, stores were sent a poster every week containing cumulative sales growth figures for all five 
stores in their group, ranked in descending order. These posters were sent to the store manager and it was 
up to him or her to communicate it to the store’s employees, who received no direct communication about 
the treatments. Store managers in the other treatment group also received those posters, but additionally 
they participated in a six-week tournament where the manager and all employees of the winning store 
received a reward of 75 Euro with a prize of 35 Euro for the runner-up. The average treatment effect of 
the poster and the poster plus prize treatment was an approximately five-percentage point increase in sales 
growth. Interestingly, adding prizes to rank feedback did not yield an additional improvement in 
performance.  The treatment effect was stronger when the gender of the store manager was similar to the 
predominant gender in a store, which the authors interpret as evidence for improved communication and 
motivation channels in those stores.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
3 Aoyagi (2007 and 2010) and Ederer (2010) characterize the assumptions required for feedback to lead to optimal 
effort provision which are what agents know about their ability and how that ability enters the production function 
and the shape of their cost of effort functions. 
4 See also Smither et al., 2005. 
5 An early paper on the effect of status on performance is Greenberg (1988), who published data from a field 
experiment of 198 employees in an insurance under-writing department. While the firm renovated its offices 
employees had to be relocated to other offices. The clever aspect of this paper is that this relocation was randomized, 
so that employees were moved to offices that corresponded to the same, lower, or higher pay-grades. Compared to 
those employees who were relocated to an office in line with their current pay-grade, those reassigned to higher-
status offices increased their performance, whereas those assigned to lower-status offices reduced their performance. 
The effect of information about relative performance has also been studied experimentally in the context of 
electricity consumption (Costa et al, 2010) and job satisfaction (Card et al, 2010), and interpersonal wage 
comparisons (Charness and Kuhn, 2007). 
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One possible mechanism for the increase in performance is that the presence of those posters 
added a new dimension to that work environment and may have enticed those employees to experiment 
and learn how additional effort would raise their rank. As the treatments lasted only six weeks, this 
learning and experimentation might have persisted throughout the study.6 In contrast, the subjects in my 
experiment have been given rank feedback for several years and the principal treatment was to remove 
that information, which is a more effective way of separating rank incentives from the effect of learning 
about how effort increases rankings.  
In two studies, rank information was introduced at the same point in time to all employees.  The 
first study was by Bandiera et al (2012), which studied fruit-pickers who worked in teams of five pickers.  
All pickers in a team were paid the same amount, and once a week pickers could themselves change the 
composition of their team at a team exchange.  The first phase of the treatment consisted of posting 
histograms with team-level performance sorted in descending order.  A later phase added weekly 
tournaments with a prize for the best team worth approximately 5% of the weekly wage.  They find that 
posting those rankings reduces team performance.  The mechanism behind the result was the endogenous 
change in team composition: Instead of forming teams with friends, the fruit-pickers began to form teams 
with people of similar ability which, given the skewed distribution of ability across pickers, lead to a drop 
in performance. The second study was by Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2010), which involves performance 
data about grocery packers at a warehouse. The company chose to start posting the performance rank of 
employees, which the authors exploit as a quasi-experimental design. This study is very notable, as it 
finds in contrast to this paper that publically providing rank feedback increases sales.  
The identification challenge in these two studies arises due to the absence of a contemporaneous 
control group, making it difficult to separate the treatment effects from time trends and general shocks to 
productivity, which my randomized control trial can address. More importantly, the fruit pickers in 
Bandiera et al. (2012) and the grocery packers in Blanes-i-Vidal and Nossol (2012) do not have flexibility 
in terms of what tasks they can work on except for the one job they are given to do. However, in my 
setting, which perhaps is more representative, furniture salespeople can either sell products from one 
brand or from other brands, which opens up a new and more realistic behavioral response: When 
salespeople learn that they rank poorly selling one brand, they could shift their attention to selling other 
brands to excel there. 
The laboratory is a very useful environment to study the effect of performance rankings, as it 
allows for tight control of the sequence of events, the production functions, and the flow of information. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
6 The gender pattern in their results is also in line with that interpretation as it was up to the store manager to 
motivate the employees to work harder, which arguably is easier when there was gender alignment between them. 
8 
?
An important laboratory study of rankings7 is by Kuhnen and Tymula (2011), who show that when the 
information about rank is worse than expected, experimental subjects subsequently increase their 
performance. This mechanism also inspired the analysis in my study where I test separately the treatment 
effect depending on whether the achieved rank is better or worse than expected. In contrast to Kuhnen and 
Tymula (2011), there is no treatment effect in my context when rank is better than expected but telling 
people that their rank is worse than expected leads to a demoralization effect – a drop in performance. 
Despite the similarity, there are of course a number of differences between their laboratory and my field 
setting. One difference is that in my setting, I can again rule out learning as a mechanism behind my 
results, as the principal treatment is to remove rank feedback rather than to adding it. Furthermore, I study 
subjects over several years, a much longer time horizon than what is possible in the lab, and agents can 
multi-task and shift their efforts to selling the other brands. 
In the education context, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) make use of a natural experiment. They find 
that relative performance feedback raises high school students’ educational attainment using data from 
Spanish school districts. A possibility, germane to studying rankings in an education setting, is that the 
results might predominantly be driven by pecuniary interests rather than concerns about rank per se: The 
treatment effect gets stronger closer to graduation where relative performance matters even more in the 
job market and for college admissions. Furthermore, their results could also be driven by changes in the 
behavior of the parents rather than the students themselves.  
Rankings are often used to hand out symbolic awards. Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011) hired 
students to enter data for three weeks as part of a non-governmental organization project. The treatment 
was to honor the best performance publically with a symbolic award. They found that the award treatment 
raised performance by 12%. Awards, which are a form of tournament, are different from rank incentives 
in general as only the winners are singled out with the award whereas the rest do not know where they 
stood vis-à-vis the winners. 
In a companion paper to this field experiment (Barankay, 2012), I replicated the main effect of a 
reduction in performance due to rank feedback. The setting of that paper was the crowd-sourcing 
Webpage by Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). On that Webpage, people can log in to work 
on piece-rate tasks online and in the experiment, I offered data-entry jobs via that Webpage. After an 
initial round of work, all subjects were invited by email to return for another assignment. I randomized 
the content of those emails, the control group received the invitation and the treatment group was 
additionally told their performance rank, but it was emphasized that the ranking was unrelated to the 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
7 Another elegant laboratory experiment involving feedback about rank is Charness et al (2010) showing how rank 
leads to unintended consequences like artificially inflating performance and sabotage. See also the studies by 
Freeman and Gelber (2010), and Hannan et al (2008). 
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invitation. The result was that those workers who were told their rank were less likely to return to work, 
and when they did return, they were less productive.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
To help organize the core results of this paper, I set up a framework building on the Holmstrom-Milgrom 
(1991) multi-tasking model, which is then extended with preferences over rank to illustrate how providing 
rank feedback can reduce effort. In my experiment, the incentive schemes are exogenously varied, so I 
focus on the agents’ optimization problem and do not derive optimal contracts. Also, in line with the 
experimental design below, all feedback will be truthful. 
Suppose salesperson ?’s payoff contains three components. First, she derives utility from the 
monetary benefit of her effort. This benefit ?? ?? ? ??? approximates the commission-based 
compensation scheme salespeople face and reflects how their effort maps into commission payouts. 
Second, each agent ? can exert effort into one of two tasks ? ? ?? ? , which captures that she can either 
sell one brand, denoted by “1”, or other furniture brands, “2”.  
Second, exerting effort generates cost ?? ??? ?? ? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ? ????? , where ? ? ? ?
?????? captures the complementarity in cost between the tasks. This is the key assumption generating 
effort substitution effects in multi-tasking models: Raising effort on one task, raises the marginal cost of 
effort on the other task. 
The third element generates preferences for rank. Assume that the agent receives a rank reward 
??? ? ? from achieving a “high” rank. The rank needed to obtain this reward and the value of ??? can vary 
across agents. Assume that the effort required to obtain this rank is ????.  A critical assumption here is that 
???? is not known by the agent and the agent either has to rely on feedback from the principal or on her 
beliefs about its level ????.8 Denote by ???? and ???? dummy variables equal to one when the effort exceeds 
the required level, ??? ? ????, and zero otherwise. The agent maximizes her utility with respect to ??? and 
???: 
 
?? ? ??? ? ??????????? ? ??????????????? ? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ? ??????    (1) 
 
The agent equalizes the marginal return from effort for each brand and its marginal cost. Focusing on the 
case when the effort exceeds the amount required to obtain the rank reward, ??? ? ???? ? ???? ? ???? ? ?,9 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
8 The rational for this informational assumption is for ease of exposition. Suppose all salesperson’s performance is a 
function of effort plus a random walk shock where the agent only observes the shock after choosing effort. The 
agents form beliefs about the other agents’ abilities and the current state of shocks. 
9 Otherwise ??? ? ? and/or ??? ? ?.  
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we have the two first-order-conditions ?? ? ??? ? ?????? ? ???? and ?? ? ??? ? ?????? ? ????. The unique 
solution to the agent’s problem of how much effort to put into selling the main furniture brand 1 is: 
???? ? ?????? ????? ???????????????           (2) 
 
Prediction 1: The effect of rank feedback is heterogeneous across agents. 
 
The first prediction is driven by the intuitive assumption that preferences vary both in terms of the 
marginal cost of effort and by the effort required by an agent to obtain the rank reward ???: Some need to 
obtain a higher rank than others to have a perceived boost in their self-image. I will explore this 
empirically by testing for significant treatment effects by gender and other observable characteristics. The 
important point here will be to test if there are taste-based heterogeneities in rank incentives that are not 
driven by other mechanisms such as the responses to pecuniary benefits in financial tournaments. 
When an agent does not get rank feedback, she has to rely on her beliefs ???? ?in whether she has 
obtained the rank reward ???. Agents choose effort first and then, depending on the treatment, will or will 
not learn how the effort mapped into a rank. When they do get rank feedback, the achieved rank might be 
lower or higher than what they expected it to be based on their prior beliefs. Rank feedback can then 
decrease effort for three reasons: 
Case i) Complacency after overshooting (??? > ???). A salesperson, using her 
beliefs, can end up putting in too much effort to obtain ???, and will adjust her effort 
downwards when she is told via rank feedback that she “over-shot.” 
Case ii) Demoralization (??? < ???). An agent, based on her beliefs will try to 
obtain ???, but in fact the effort required to obtain this rank reward is too high in that she is 
better off not pursuing the rank reward.10 Rank feedback will then reduce her effort. 
Case iii) Multi-tasking. An agent, upon getting rank feedback that she did not 
obtain the rank reward for task 1, ???, as ???? ? ?, could reduce her effort on task 1 when it 
requires less effort to obtain the reward from the other task, ???? This is a new effect in a 
multi-tasking environment: When people hear they have low relative performance on task 1 
they switch to excel on task 2. 
These three cases lead to the second prediction. 
 
Prediction 2: Rank feedback leads to a drop in performance under Cases i) to iii) . 
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
??? ?????????????????? ???????????? ? ??????? ??????????????? ? ???
? ? ?????? ????? ??????????????? ??
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The next prediction makes a subtler point that lies at the heart of the multi-tasking problem. 
When effort substitution is high, i.e. ? ? ?, then raising effort on one dimension of the task also increases 
the marginal cost of effort for the other task: In this case, selling products for the first brand makes it 
harder to sell products of the other brand. I can rewrite (2) as 
 
???? ? ?????? ????? ??????????????? ?
??????? ??????
????????? ?
??????
?????????.      (3) 
 
When an agent no longer pursues the rank reward for product one, i.e. ???? ? ???her effort drops by 
??????
????????? , which is increasing in ??  
 
Prediction 3: Rank feedback will reduce effort more for those sales that have a high effort substitution 
across brands.  
 
Extensions 
So far we abstracted from shocks to productivity. More generally productivity is driven by effort and 
current, period specific shocks to productivity. Even when agents learn how their effort maps into ranking 
in the long-run, they benefit from frequent feedback as it allows them to adjust their effort depending on 
the current state of those productivity shocks. This is at the principal rational behind using tournaments as 
a way to elicit efficient effort provision (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), as it filters out period specific shocks 
to productivity that are common to agents. In our context, when the rank of a salesperson turns out to be 
lower than expected, the agent could either reduce her effort and shift it to task 2 or she could increase her 
effort by the required amount to reach ??? ? ???. This, however, requires that the principal informs the 
salesperson how much additional effort currently is required to obtain the rank reward, i.e. the measure of 
???? ? ????. This mechanism is also known as the path-goal model (House, 1971, 1996) 
 
Prediction 4: Compared to receiving rank feedback alone, an agent will raise effort when she also 
receives information on benchmarks that help her gauge the required effort needed to obtain the rank 
reward. 
 
Lastly, one very different behavioral explanation for the effect of rank feedback on performance is that 
the agent may perceive relative performance feedback as a signal about the principal’s intentions and 
technical capability to condition rewards on relative performance in the future (Benabou and Tirole, 
2003). This then leads to an increase in effort as agents want to signal their ability and motivation to the 
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principal.  To separate this effect we need a mechanism that triggers this updating of beliefs without rank 
incentives. We will test for this mechanism by having one treatment arm where agents only receive 
benchmarks on what it takes to be in the top 10%, 25% and 50%, the idea being that this treatment should 
bring about a change in beliefs about the principals future linking of relative performance to 
compensation but is not triggering rank incentives, as agents are only told benchmarks instead of their 
rank. 
 
Context and Methods 
The firm I study is a leading office furniture company in North America. The natural field experiment 
(Harrison and List, Rasul and List, 2011, Levitt and List, 2009, Bandiera et al, 2011a) was designed and 
implemented in collaboration with the company’s incentive scheme management team. The company 
designs, manufactures, and distributes the furniture, but they outsource the sales to independent 
dealerships. Those independent dealerships hire their own salespeople who then sell the office furniture 
directly to companies. The final clients are predominantly companies rather than private individuals.  
Importantly for my paper, salespeople in the independent dealerships can sell other furniture 
products, as long as they are not from a set of specified direct competitors. I do not have direct data on 
their sales for other products, but I administered a survey in 2012 to elicit more information about how 
they allocated their time across tasks. Data from the 2012 survey shows the percentage of time allocated 
across the different tasks and the total hours worked per week. The survey had 617 respondents and 
reveals that on average they work 41-50 hours per week in total,11 and they spend on average 61.54% of 
their work time selling the furniture company’s brand, 17.6% selling other manufacturers’ products, and 
the remaining 20.7% of their time on other tasks not involving sales. Only 2% of salespeople report that 
they exclusively sell furniture by the company.12 All taken together, each salesperson and dealership thus 
faces a multi-tasking problem, whereby they need to decide how to allocate their time and effort between 
selling furniture from the main brand or from the other brands.  
As is common for salespeople, their compensation is commission-based, whereby they earn a 
percentage of the dollar value of their sales.13 The commission rates are the same for everyone in North 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
11 Of the respondents, 20% work 30 hours of less, 16% work 31-40 hours, 46% work for 41-50 hours, 25% work 51-
60 hours, and 9% work more than 60 hours per week. 
12 That survey also asked how the commission rates compared to those of the other brands. 52% stated that the 
commission rates were comparable to those offered by the other brands. Of the others, 21% said other brands 
offered more generous commission rates, and 18% said other brands offered less generous commission rates, 9% did 
not sell furniture from the other brands. 
13 As is common in commission-based compensations, the commission system resets at the start of each calendar or 
fiscal year and the commission rate rises at specific thresholds based on year-to-date total sales. The exact 
commission rates of the scheme are confidential. To make an illustrative example, however, the commission rate is 
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America. As is typical for such an outsourced sales arrangement, the furniture company gives salespeople 
very precise price-discount guidelines. It is important to stress two points here: First, the fact that 
compensation is purely commission-based with no guaranteed fixed payments implies a very high-
powered incentive scheme. Second, conditional on these commissions, performance rankings do not 
convey any additional material benefits.  
The task of the salespeople is primarily to get current clients to buy new products rather than to 
identify new clients. Most of the clients are medium to large companies that have well-established 
relationships with the dealerships. There is no competition for clients within or across dealerships as they 
are operating in geographically separated markets. The 1,754 salespeople in the data work in 204 
dealerships across the U.S. and Canada and comprise the universe of all salespeople who sold furniture 
under the furniture company’s commission-based system between 2009 and 2011. Salespeople are 
typically full-time employees in the respective dealerships with a median tenure of seven years. In this 
setting, the furniture salespeople’s production technology is such that there is no scope for cooperation 
between salespeople within a dealership, and each salesperson exclusively focuses on the sales aspect in 
the furniture business. For instance, the detailed choice of patterns and colors of a client’s order is 
completed by other employees and not by the salesperson. Each salesperson thus has to decide how much 
effort to exert in selling products from this or from other furniture brands.  
The demand for office furniture products varies greatly over time for two reasons. First, the 
experiment spans the time of the aftermath and the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis, which led to a 
sharp decline in furniture sales in the beginning of 2009 prior to the start of the experiment followed by a 
slow recovery in the ensuing years. Second, furniture is sold directly to companies, which tend to group 
orders in time, so that sales volume varies from month to month for a salesperson. These features of the 
context are addressed in the experimental design and the data analysis. First, as explained further below, I 
used contemporaneous treatment groups, which allow me to control for seasonal variations like the Great 
Recession with period dummy variables. Second, I study long-run treatment effects that will smooth out 
the intermittent nature of sales. 
A key element of the work environment and the platform for experimentation is a personalized 
Webpage the salespeople can access, which existed well before the start of the experiment. The purpose 
of the Webpage is twofold. First, it allows the salespeople to verify whether all their sales have been 
correctly recorded and attributed to them. Second, this Webpage contains a wealth of data about their 
absolute performance to date by listing their current and year-to-date sales, the commissions they earned, 
and their current commission rates. This Webpage remained available to all salespeople throughout the 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
x% below $10,000 and (x+0.5)% between $10,000 and $25,000 etc. These steps are small so they don’t give rise to 
gaming and ratcheting during the year. 
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experiment. Based on login data, salespeople on average access that Webpage twice a month. In the 
experiment, as explained in detail further below, I randomized the content of that webpage.14 
 
Perception and Usage of Rankings 
The firm gave rank feedback for many years to their salespeople and I was interested in what the sales 
people thought the effects of the rankings were. In a survey in April 2012, I asked them how much they 
agreed or disagreed with the following two statements: “Companies that rank sales performance try to pit 
their employees against each other.” Only 15.69% of salespeople agreed with this statement.15 Next I 
stated, “Companies that rank sales performance try to instill healthy competition to entice employees to 
be more ambitious.” 551 out of 771 respondents (71.5%) agreed with this statement.16 These answers are 
notable, as they make it unlikely that the behavioral response to rank feedback is shaped by a negative 
perception of the furniture company. 
I then wanted to know how they use the rank feedback data. I asked them to state how much they 
agree or disagree with five statements (with the percent agreeing noted in parentheses). The first items 
explored whether rankings affect self-image, which does not require publicity, or status, which does. 
[A] “Knowing my [brand name] sales rank makes me feel good about myself, even when others don't 
know my rank position.” (70.52% agreed) 
[B] “I enjoy getting recognition from my peers as I talk to them about my [brand name] sales rank.” 
(34.92% agreed). 
More agreed with statement [A] than [B], thus rank feedback seems to affect self-image rather 
than status.  
Of key importance in this paper is that rankings convey no additional monetary benefits either 
present or deferred. Nevertheless, it could be that the salespeople use their rank in the job market but this 
does not seem to be the case as only few agreed with this statement:   
[C] “Knowing my sales rank adds verifiable data I can use on my resume to potentially help me get 
a better job or a promotion.” (27.55%) 
This is the statement that the salespeople agreed with the least, which gives additional credibility 
to my claim that rankings do not convey pecuniary benefits neither present or for a job search. 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
14 For reasons of confidentiality, I am not permitted to show screenshots of this Webpage, as it would permit 
identification of the company’s name. 
15 On a five point scale, 12.1% “strongly disagree,” 38.0% “disagree somewhat,” 34.2% “neither agree nor 
disagree,” 13.9% “agree somewhat,” and 1.8% “strongly agree.” There were 771 responses. 
16 On a five point scale, 1.8% “strongly disagree,” 5.5% “disagree somewhat,” 21.3% “neither agree nor disagree,” 
60.4% “agree somewhat,” and 11.0% “strongly agree.” There were 771 respondents. The correlation in responses 
between this and the previous statement that rankings pit employees against each other is 0.17. 
15 
?
As highlighted in the tournament literature, a benefit of rankings is that it allows people to filter 
out the effect of their effort on productivity from time-specific productivity shocks that are common 
across salespeople (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Since rankings are independent of factors affecting 
performance that are common to all sales people, they make it easier to learn about real changes in ones 
own productivity. To see if this is of importance to salespeople we asked them how much they agree with 
the following statements.  
[D] “Knowing my sales rank helps me evaluate my own performance.“ (56.25% agreed) 
[E] “Knowing my sales rank helps me determine the market demand for [brand name] products and 
thus whether it is worth my while to try harder to sell [brand name] furniture.” (37.43%) 
Even though rank is used for performance evaluation, when asked explicitly, the salespeople do 
not use rankings to filter out common shocks to their productivity.  
In sum, salespeople primarily use rank feedback as a way to shape self-image rather than to learn 
about market conditions or to further their career. 
 
Timing of Events and Treatments 
Prior to the start of the experiment in August 2009, all salespeople saw their rank on their personalized 
Webpage. Specifically, they saw next to their name their rank in terms of year-to-date sales in North 
America.17 Showing employees their rank is common in the sales business and is practiced by many other 
companies as well (Grote, 2005).18  
To be clear, all salespeople had access to that Webpage throughout the experiment and I did not 
remove or alter information about their absolute performance, e.g. commission payouts and rates. 
The treatments of this field experiment comprised the randomized manipulation of information about 
relative performance that was displayed on the Webpage.  
As is common practice in field experiments, I first had a relatively short pilot phase from August 
to December 2009 that allowed for the testing of whether the reprogrammed Webpages displayed 
correctly. During that pilot phase, I randomized salespeople into three groups. The first group could 
continue to view their rank in terms of year-to-date sales on their personalized Webpage, but the second 
group no longer saw that ranking information. In the third group, I experimented with a different way to 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
17 Based on my survey in April 2012, salespeople on average know the correct number of salespeople actively 
selling the company’s products in North America. 
18 For instance GE, Google, Microsoft, Whirlpool, but also the hospital at the University of Pennsylvania give 
ranked performance feedback to their employees. The frequency of this feedback varies and in some firms 
employees are told their actual rank whereas in other companies they give bands, e.g. middle 50%. The variance in 
the way rank feedback is implemented is testimony to the need for a better understanding of its effect on 
performance. 
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calculate rank, taking into account state-level differences in market conditions. This was called the 
“Normalized Rank” and only used during the pilot phase.19  
Based on this pilot phase where I noticed a difference in treatments by gender, I implemented a 
two-by-two randomized control trial. For reasons of statistical power, I had to span the experiment due to 
the large variance in sales performance: As I wanted to be able to test the difference across treatments and 
by gender, I could only have three treatment groups per year to achieve the required statistical power. To 
deal with possible selection effects, differential attrition, and unbalanced treatment groups, all people 
were re-randomized into treatments at the start of 2010 and 2011. 
The experiment randomized whether salespeople saw their rank on the Webpage and whether 
benchmarks were also displayed. The benchmarks were the current sales-performance of those just inside 
the top 10%, top 25%, and top 50%. The data was updated daily on the Webpage. 
 
Let me describe the sequence of treatments. Up until August 2009 all salespeople saw their rank 
but no benchmarks. In the pilot phase from August to December 2009, one group continued to see their 
rank which I call the “Rank Feedback” treatment, the second group did not see their rank (“No Rank 
Feedback”) and a third saw a “Normalized Rank” (see footnote 19).  
In 2010, one group saw their rank on the Webpage, the “Rank Feedback” treatment, but the 
second group did not see their rank (“No Rank Feedback”), and the third group saw their rank together 
with the benchmarks (“Rank Feedback & Benchmarks”).  
In 2011, the two-by-two matrix was completed by having one group be assigned to “No Rank 
Feedback,” another to “Rank Feedback & Benchmarks,” and the third to “Benchmarks” alone.  
 
Following the discussion in the theoretical section, the benchmark treatments served two 
purposes. First, it allows me to distinguish rank incentives form another mechanism whereby employees 
interpret it as a signal by the principal that she has the IT capabilities to easily construct rankings, and that 
explicit rewards based on rank will come. The second purpose is to give those who are told their rank 
additional information of what it takes to make a difference to their rank. This mechanism, also known as 
the path-goal model (House, 1971, 1996), predicts that providing a path – the distance to cover to get to 
the next benchmark – is an effective organizational leadership tool to help employees achieve their goals.  
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
19 More precisely, I regressed each salesperson’s rank onto state fixed effects and then used the residual to calculate 
the “normalized rank.” Those salespeople who saw this ranking were informed on the Webpage that “the normalized 
rank employs a statistical method that takes into account differences in market condition across regions so that all 
dealerships in North America are comparable to each other.” This treatment was only used during the pilot phase as 
it was not significantly different from the “Rank Feedback” treatment. 
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Discussion of the Context 
There are several noteworthy features in this context that permit the study of whether people care about 
their rank per se. First, salespeople are only compensated for their absolute performance. They have a 
very high-powered incentive scheme based on commissions. For a given level of absolute sales, a change 
in rankings does not affect their compensation. This is important as otherwise preferences for rank might 
be confounded with a concern for the direct pecuniary benefits associated with rankings. Second, all 
salespeople had easy access to a Webpage where they could review data on their absolute performance as 
measured by their own sales history. Thus, rankings were not needed to proxy for information about 
absolute performance and ability, as that was always available to all employees. Third, rankings were 
based on year-to-date sales, which made them less volatile and a more reliable representation of relative 
performance. Fourth, even if no claim can be made that the subjects were representative of the overall 
U.S. labor force, they exhibited a broad range of demographic backgrounds in terms of age, job 
experience, demographic location and had a balanced gender mix with 56% of the salespeople being 
female. 
I considered randomizing whether to show them the rank within the dealership, but after visiting 
several stores, it became clear that all salespeople readily had access to this information as it was 
prominently displayed and communicated in their offices. So I would lack the experimental control to 
estimate the effect of dealership rankings. As the study uses national rank, which based on my survey in 
April 2012 is the second most important reference group after that in a dealership, I induced an 
attenuation bias in the estimated treatment effects.  
It is important in an experimental study to distinguish between planned comparisons and those 
that are invoked after the end of the experiment. Apart from the comparisons across treatment arms, I also 
planned on comparing treatments by whether agents receive positive or negative feedback, i.e. “good” 
versus “bad” news. The interest in results by gender emerged at the end of the pilot phase in 2009 when I 
discovered evidence for gender specific effects. This was the principal reason why I spaced out the 
experiment across two years to gain sufficient statistical power. 
 
Level of Randomization 
The randomizations were done at the salesperson level. Balancing tests are reported at the top of Table 1. 
Here I regressed the sales performance in a year on the treatment dummies of the prior year and tested for 
the joint significance of those dummy variables. I repeat the same regressions with gender as the 
dependent variable. The treatment dummies are not jointly significant, so I cannot reject the null 
hypotheses of balanced treatment groups in line with evidence for a successful randomization.  
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As I randomized at the salesperson level, the design effect and the scope for contamination 
needed to be addressed. The design effect, which is the inflation to the sample size required due to 
correlated shocks in each dealership to achieve a pre-determined power in the statistical tests, was 
negligible here as the group size, which here is the average number of salespeople per dealerships, was 
small [mean 6.34, standard dev. 4.80] as was the intra-class correlation coefficient at the dealership level 
(0.12631). So the sample sizes used were large enough to identify the treatment effects. 
Beyond correlated shocks to productivity at the dealership-level, a possible concern was 
contamination of the control group by the treatment group within a dealership. There are two reasons that 
allow for the argument that contamination was not generating important biases in the estimated treatment 
effects. First, sales-people worked on accounts, i.e. clients, by themselves so there was no teamwork 
involved within a dealership. Second, the design of the randomization was such that contamination can be 
tested. Note that the randomization had been conducted at the salesperson level and therefore the share of 
salespeople in each dealership who were being informed about their rank was random as well. I then 
tested whether the treatment effect varied with the share of salespeople in a dealership who were 
receiving the other treatments. The test of these local interaction effects fails to reject the null of no local 
contamination effects.20  
 
Results 
In this section, I report and interpret the results of the field experiment. The presentation starts by 
reviewing time-series graphs at the month-treatment level. I then review averages and differences in 
means at the treatment-salesperson level followed by panel regressions estimating across and within 
salesperson treatment effects. Finally, I test for heterogeneous treatment effects depending on the type of 
rank feedback and across different product categories to explore an implication of the multi-tasking 
model. In each case, I present the results for the overall effect and split by gender.21 
 
Time series graph 
Figure 1a shows the time-series from 2009 to the end of 2011 of the monthly average of those salespeople 
who had sales. I drew separate lines for each treatment group. Note also the vertical lines indicating the 
points in time when salespeople were randomized or re-randomized to the different treatment groups. The 
sharp decline in sales in the beginning of 2009 is due to the aftermath of the recession. As the commission 
rate system resets at the beginning of each year, many salespeople switch to selling other brands at the 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
???Results omitted due to space constraints but available upon request. 
???I also tested if the treatments had an effect on attrition, i.e. on whether salespeople remained in the sample but I 
find no evidence for it (results omitted but available upon request).?
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start of the year, so only those with large and steady sales remain active then. This explains the peak in 
this graph in January of each year. Note that these period effects will be filtered out in the regression 
analysis below. 
The dashed line is the “Rank Feedback” treatment and has the lowest sales for most months in the 
pilot phase and for all months during 2010. This treatment was no longer in place in 2011. The dark solid 
line is the “No Rank Feedback” treatment, which for most months in the pilot phase of 2009 and 2010 led 
to the highest sales. Interestingly, the treatment “Rank Feedback & Benchmarks” was as success as the 
“No Feedback” treatment in raising performance. Finally, the three remaining treatments performed 
equally well during 2011. 
The next two graphs draw the times series separately by gender. Figure 1b, shows that for women 
there is no clear pattern of treatment response. In contrast, Figure 1c shows very accentuated differences 
for men: Male salespeople who saw their rank had the lowest sales compared to those without rank 
feedback, as well as those in the “Rank Feedback & Benchmarks” treatment who both had higher sales.  
In sum, the graphs highlight two results. First, only showing rank led to the lowest sales and 
second, the results are gender specific with larger differences for men and no discernable treatment effects 
for women.  
 
Treatment-person Level Effects 
As a first cut at the data, I now turn to formal tests of differences in means by treatment and year using 
data for all salespeople from the start of the experiment in August 2009 to the end of 2011. In Table 2, I 
show the weighted average of monthly sales by treatment where the weights are the number of months a 
salesperson had sales. At the edges of the table, I then report the tests of differences in means. I 
constructed the means by first taking averages at the salesperson-treatment level and then calculating the 
means for each treatment across salespeople. In the Appendix and in Table A1, I also test for differences 
in means by treatment separately for each year and gender. 
Turning to Table 2A there are three significant differences means in the full sample of all salespeople. 
First, removing rank feedback increases sales (Prediction 2): In the top line with “No Benchmarks,” the 
difference in means between the “No Rank,” cell [1] in Table 2A, and “Rank Feedback” [2] treatment 
was an increase of 0.201 from 8.577 to 8.778 log of average monthly sales. This difference is significant 
at the 1% level. This is a seemingly large effect but note that the standard deviation associated with these 
means is large, so that the treatment effect is about one fifth of a standard deviation.  
Second, making feedback data more actionable increases sales (Prediction 3): Looking into the first 
column with rank feedback, adding Benchmarks [3]-[1], increases sales by 0.276, about a quarter of a 
standard deviation, which is precisely estimated and significant at the 1% level.  
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Third, I also find that removing rank feedback and instead only giving benchmarks increases sales by 
0.292, about a third of a standard deviation, significant at the 1% level, but there is no difference in means 
between Rank and Benchmarks [3], No Rank and Benchmarks [2], and No Rank and No Benchmarks [4].  
Thus all treatments raised sales over the status quo in the company of only showing rank by some 20%. 
In the next two panels, I separately test for differences in means for women, panel 2B, and men, 
panel 2C, and overall the same pattern of result emerges.  
 
Across and Within Estimates: Treatment-Salesperson-Month Level Data 
To effectively control for period effects, like the recession, I need to run panel regressions. As discussed 
above there are contemporaneous treatment groups so I can control for any period effects with year-
month dummies ruling out any trends and time specific confounds that could bias my estimates. 
Specifically I estimate: 
 
???? ? ??????? ? ??????? ? ????? ? ??       (4) 
 
where ???? is the log of monthly sales, measured in thousands of USD, for a salesperson, NR is a dummy 
equal to one when a salesperson is being shown neither rank feedback nor the benchmarks. RB is a 
dummy equal to unity for those who received both rank feedback and benchmarks, and finally B denotes 
whether a salesperson only received benchmarks. The omitted category is to receive rank feedback only, 
which was the status quo for all salespeople prior to the start of the experiments. This regression also 
includes a set of dummies ? for each month in each year of the experiment. 
In column (1) Table 3, I use the full sample from 2009 to 2011. All standard errors are clustered 
at the salesperson level. I find, in line with Prediction 2, a positive and precisely estimated treatment 
effect of removing rank compared to displaying ranking on the Webpage,???? = 10.9%**, significant at 
the 5% level, which is about one tenth of a standard deviation of the dependent variable. I can also see 
that showing rank feedback together with benchmarks has the same positive and precisely estimated 
effects as “No Rank Feedback”, ??? = 12.5%, significant at the 5% level. Benchmarks alone are not 
raising productivity compared to not giving rank information, ?? = 6.37%, not significant at conventional 
levels, and the effect is smaller than providing Rank Feedback with Benchmarks even though the 
difference in the coefficients, ??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ????? ? ????? is not significant at conventional 
levels. Nevertheless this is first evidence that rankings have an effect over and above benchmarks alone. 
This is important to tease apart the effect of rank incentives from the mechanism whereby salespeople 
respond to the change in feedback, as they update their beliefs about future changes to compensation 
schemes. 
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Next, I test for gender differences in treatment response. The motivation to study gender 
differences is twofold. First, I wanted to provide evidence that the gender differences in attitudes towards 
competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) extends to rank incentives as well. Second, robust gender 
differences would go towards providing additional evidence that rank incentives are a taste-based 
phenomenon and not primarily driven by economic incentives as would be the case for feedback in 
tournaments prizes.  
In column (2) I am estimating: 
???? ? ???? ???? ? ???? ???? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ? ?????????? ? ???????? ? ?  (5) 
where the subscript “?” denotes the treatment effect for men and “? ? ?” the difference in 
treatment effects between men and women. To make the table easier to read, I also reported the marginal 
effects separately by gender. 
In line with Prediction 1, the treatment effects of “No Rank Feedback” are gender specific. 
Removing rank increases monthly sales by 16.0% for men, which is precisely estimated at the 5% level. 
There is, however, no significant treatment effect for women, (0.0633, p-value = 0.279).  
Showing both rank together with benchmarks increases sales for men by 20.3%, which is 
significant at the 1% level, but again there is no such effect for women, (0.0544, p-value = 0.369). In 
contrast, benchmarks alone do not affect performance compared to other treatments, as the effect is very 
small and insignificant both for men, 0.00975, and for women (0.101, p-value = 0.245). 
I can also confirm that the mechanism behind rank feedback results for men is in line with rank 
incentives, and not a change in their beliefs over future compensation schemes. If beliefs were the driving 
factor then showing benchmarks alone should generate similar treatment response. This is not the case as 
the difference in the coefficients for men of ???? ? ??? ? ????? ? ??????? is significant at the 5% level. 
This also rules out the Hawthorne effect. Therefore rank has an effect on performance for men over and 
above benchmarks alone.  
I have a subsample of 889 salespeople who are present in all three years, some of which 
witnessed several treatments depending on their randomization outcome. For those salespeople, I can 
estimate the within treatment effects with salesperson dummy variables by estimating:  
 
???? ? ???? ???? ? ???? ???? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ? ?????????? ? ???????? ? ?? ? ? (6) 
 
where ? is a vector of salesperson fixed effects. In column (9), I can confirm that the effect of not 
showing rank increases performance for men by 11.7%, which is significant at the 5% level, but the effect 
for women again is not significant.  
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Columns (4) to (9) report the estimates separately for each year 20091, 2010, and 2011, and also by 
gender. Note that in columns (1)-(4) and (7)-(8) the omitted category is “Rank Feedback”, but in columns 
(5) and (6) the omitted category is “No Rank Feedback,” as the “Rank Feedback” treatment was no longer 
in place in 2011. In the Appendix, Table A2, and Figure A1a-c, I discuss how the main and gender 
specific effects are robust across the conditional distribution of productivity using quantile regressions, so 
that the result is neither driven by the tails of the distribution nor by mean reversion.  
Table A3 provides further robustness checks of the gender effects.  One possible confounding effect for 
these gender results is that male and female salespeople may be different from each other apart from their 
sex. However, I find that even after controlling for other types of observable heterogeneity, there is still a 
significant gender difference in treatment response. 
 
Expected Rank: Good Vs. Bad News 
As discussed in the theoretical section (Prediction 2), the response to rank feedback may be different 
depending on whether that feedback conveys “good” or “bad news” in the sense that the achieved rank is 
higher or lower than the expected rank.  
To proxy for “bad news,” I created a dummy variable equal to one when the rank in a given year is lower 
than at the end of the prior year.22 Define ?????? as a dummy variable equal to one when a salesperson ? 
in year ? and month ? has a lower rank that month than the rank at the end of the prior year.23 As this 
requires one prior year of data, the sample now uses sales data from 2010 and 2011. In column (1) of 
Table 4, I estimated the baseline regression with this new sample giving me qualitatively the same results 
as before in Table 3 column (1). 
In Table 4 column 2, I then estimated the following model: 
???? ? ???? ????? ? ???? ????? ? ??????? ? ??????????? ? ?????? ? ??????????? ? ?????? ?
??????????????????????? ? ????? ? ??????? ? ?? ? ?.       (7) 
The coefficients in the top of Table 4 column (2) are not significant. The interpretation of those 
coefficients is the treatment effect when the rank feedback conveys good news in that the rank was higher 
in the current month than at the end of the prior year. Note that I also control for ?????? linearly thus I 
estimate the treatment effect separately from simply having a bad year.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
???Ideally, I would like to elicit prior beliefs about their expected rank as in Kuhnen and Tymula (2011), but those 
beliefs are not easy to elicit reliably via surveys in the field. I therefore opted for observable data in terms of rank 
that is higher or lower than at the end of the prior year.?
23 The results are robust to defining this dummy being equal to one when the rank is lower than 12 months before. 
Also instead of dummy variables, I constructed a variable measuring the distance of the current rank to the rank in 
the prior year giving qualitatively the same results. 
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However, looking at the bottom set of coefficients, a result emerges which is in line with 
Prediction 2. First, not giving rank feedback when it would convey bad news increases sales by over 28%, 
which is precisely estimated and significant at the 5% level or about a quarter of a standard deviation. 
Second, compared to rank feedback alone, adding benchmarks does not have a significantly different 
treatment effect when the news is bad, as the coefficient ?????? ? ?????? is not significant. This is in line 
with Prediction 4, as having more actionable data allows salespeople to raise their sales even when they 
fall short of expectations. Third, compared to rank feedback, providing benchmark data alone increases 
sales significantly more with bad feedback (????? ? ?????????) than with good feedback.  
I can conclude that receiving positive news has no significant effect on performance, as none of 
the treatment effects are significant then. Giving bad news with rank feedback, however, significantly 
reduces sales compared to not giving any feedback or giving benchmarks alone. So the driving factor 
behind the result of both Table 2 and Table 3 is the demoralization effect of being informed of an 
unexpectedly low rank. 
 
Multi-Tasking 
When salespeople learn that they are ranked worse than expected they might be particularly inclined to 
shift their sales to other brands where they won’t receive such negative feedback. As discussed in the 
theoretical section, see Prediction 3, this reduces sales even more when effort substitution is high – i.e. 
when increasing effort to sell one brand raises the cost of effort on selling the other brands. 
Studying the extent of multi-tasking in this context is empirically challenging as the salespeople 
work in over 200 independent dealerships. According to a survey I conducted in April 2012, 98.3% of 
salespeople also sell other furniture brands. The contract they have with the main brand permits them to 
sell other brands as long as they are not from the four direct competitors. I have very precise data about 
their sales activities for the main brand but do not have data on their sales for the other brands, as this 
would involve the release of personnel records by over 200 independent dealerships. 
The empirical strategy pursued here instead tests a direct implication of the multi-tasking model. 
The key insight of the multi-tasking set-up is the effort substitution problem, and I have a direct measure 
of the extent of the effort substitution parameter ? at the product line level allowing me to test whether the 
treatments vary with the size of this parameter.  
Before I describe the empirical implementation, just one more note on the multi-tasking model: 
The fact that salespeople can engage in selling more than one brand is clearly undesirable for the main 
brand. There are three ways to limit this problem. First, as long as the effort substitution is high, raising 
the commission rate on the main brand will effectively lower effort on the other brand. Second, when the 
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effort substitution is low then the company could simply hire the salespeople to stop them from selling 
other brands. Third, it could give the dealerships a direct incentive for not selling other brands. 
The furniture company pursued the third path: it gives dealerships a direct financial incentive to 
keep the share of sales of other brands below a certain threshold.  Not all product sales qualify for this 
reward though. Instead, they categorized – prior and independently from the experiment - each individual 
product line into two categories depending on whether they induce high- or low-effort substitution and, in 
line with the multi-tasking model, they only pay the rebate for the sale of low-effort substitution products. 
This scheme relies on each dealership providing information about the share of sales of other brands.24  
To sum up, I can categorize all sales into whether they induce high- or low-effort substitution. 
More precisely, from the data archives I retrieved, sales at the person-month-product level are categorized 
by whether they were of the low- or the high-effort substitution type.  
Recall from the theoretical section (Prediction 3) that when a salesperson receives bad news and 
no longer pursues the rank reward, the drop in effort is increasing in the degree of effort substitution. 
In terms of identification, the causal interpretation is still available as the company categorized 
their products into high- or low-effort substitution prior to the start of the experiment.  
The results are reported in Table 4, in columns (3) and (4) for the low-effort substitution products 
and in columns (5) and (6) for the high-effort substitution types. Comparing columns (3) and (5) shows, 
in line with Prediction 3, that the treatment is only significant for the high-effort substitution types and 
then only for the “No Rank” treatment.  
More important are the results in columns (4) and (6) where I split the results by whether 
salespeople hear good or bad news. In column (4), focusing on the “No Rank Feedback” treatment, when 
the salespeople were not told bad news, their low-effort substitution sales increase by 0.1509* (=0.2133-
0.0625; P = 0.085) compared to 0.2449*** (=0.2866-0.0417; P = 0.007) for their high-effort substitution 
sales.  Even if the difference between these two coefficients is not significant in a statistical sense 
(? ? ???????? ? ??????, the direction and the economic effect are in line with Prediction 3.  
These results indicate how the multi-tasking environment is relevant for our understanding of 
how rank incentives affect performance when the feedback given to agents is better or worse than 
expected: When people receive bad feedback they could switch to selling other brands to improve their 
self-image. This result is novel and could not be shown in an environment with only one task. 
 
 
???????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
???Clearly, there is an incentive for misreporting by the dealerships of their sales by other brands, which is mitigated 
by the fact that to qualify for the rebate the dealerships have to consent to random auditing of their sales.?
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Discussion 
Over the last decades, incentive schemes based on behavioral theories have been put forth (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003) to address some of the unintended consequences of purely monetary incentives. They 
also have the scope to be more cost effective than monetary incentives. Rankings are a plausible 
candidate for a behavioral incentive scheme as they speak to well-established theories of interpersonal 
comparisons (Festinger, 1954) and self-image (Benbou and Tirole, 2006).  
The field-experimental results presented in this paper confirm that rankings have an important 
impact on behavior, but given the multi-tasking aspect of the context a new result emerged: People may 
switch their attention to other tasks when they are being informed that their rank is lower than they 
expected it to be. I also find significant gender effects which suggests, together with other treatment 
effects and complemented by survey evidence, that rank incentives may be a taste-based phenomenon and 
not driven by financial incentives. This study is also novel in that it varied the way rank feedback was 
shown. More actionable feedback, with the addition of benchmarks, could diminish the negative effect of 
rank feedback in a multi-tasking environment.  
This horse race between several treatment effects within the same experiment is still rather rare in 
field experimentation, as it requires much larger data sets and longer time-horizons, in this case three 
years to achieve the required statistical power. Future work should emphasize such experimental designs.  
The results from this study can be informative for companies, but also for public institutions 
where the ranking of teachers and medical professionals is becoming more prevalent.  
Given the significant yet intricate behavioral response generated by such a trivial and cost-
effective intervention and its long-run consequence on behavior, this topic seems deserving of more field 
experimentation to extend our understanding of its impact on performance. 
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Appendix (not for publication) for “Rank Incentives: Evidence from a Randomized Workplace Experiment” 
 
Treatment-person-year Level Effects 
In Table A1 panel A1a, I show the weighted average of monthly sales by treatment and year where the 
weights are the number of months a salesperson had sales. At the edges of the table, I then report the tests 
of differences in means. Note that testing differences in means by year is somewhat underpowered given 
the large variance in performance across salespeople. 
In 2009, the difference in means between the “No Rank” and “Rank Feedback” treatment was an increase 
of 16.4% (p = 0.080) and the same year-level comparison for 2010 reveals an increase of 15.4% (p = 
0.024). At the bottom, I can see that adding benchmarks to rank feedback increases sales by 12.0% (p = 
0.079). Notably, there is no difference between giving actionable data with rank feedback and not 
providing any relative feedback. The other year-level comparisons of treatments were not significant.  
In the next panel A1b, I only use data for female salespeople. I find no significant differences in 
means for any contemporaneous pairwise test of differences in means. Lastly in panel A1c, I only use 
data from men. Here, I find again two results. First, not showing rank information increases sales by 
27.5% (p = 0.055) in 2009 and by 17.8% in 2010. This effect is large, but recalling the large standard 
deviation in sales it is one-fifth of a standard deviation. Second, again there is no significant difference 
between the full information treatment “Rank and Benchmarks” and the treatment with the least 
information “No Rank and No Benchmarks.” 
These results also rule out the theoretical prediction that rank feedback changes the culture of the 
workplace or induces an update in beliefs that rank will be the basis for future compensation schemes. If 
that were the case then I should see a change in performance when I add benchmarks to the “No Rank” 
treatment, but I see no evidence for it in the full sample in 2011 (Δ = -0.0219, p = 0.760), for women (Δ = 
0.0629, p = 0.507), or for men (Δ = -0.1279, p = 0.245). 
 
Dispersion of Productivity 
The evidence so far indicates that compared to only showing salespeople their rank, either not showing 
them their rank or adding benchmarks to the rank feedback increases their productivity. The theoretical 
discussion explains that the response to these treatments could be heterogeneous across salespeople. 
Informing people that their rank is low may convince them to focus on their other tasks. However, this 
effect is mitigated by the fact that people with low rank may also have low performance and therefore a 
poor rank on other tasks. Hence it is an empirical question whether the dispersion of the treatment effect 
varies across the performance distribution. 
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To check for this, I use quantile regression methods to estimate the conditional distribution of log 
productivity at different quantiles ?. I estimate: 
 
?????? ?????? ? ???????? ? ???????? ? ?????? ? ???     
 
When compared to showing the rank, the omitted category, I estimate the treatment effect of not 
showing rank (NR), showing rank and benchmarks (RB), and only showing benchmarks (B) by quantiles 
?. As before, λ are period fixed effects ruling out that any of these effects are capturing month-to-month 
changes in performance.  
In Table A2 report the simultaneous estimates at various quantiles ? first for all salespeople and 
then separately by gender. The top panel in Table A2 shows that when estimating quantiles for all 
salespeople, the effect of not providing rank incentives is positive and flat up to the 90th quantile at which 
point it is still positive, but only weakly significant (p = 0.109). Not giving rank feedback increases 
productivity homogeneously by 15.9%, 14.1%, 12.1%, 15.1%, and 7.1% at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 
90th quantile. There is a no significant difference between these effects except for the drop between the 
75th and the 90th quantile as reported at the bottom panel of Table A2.  
The effect of adding benchmarks to rank information is also positive and precisely estimated 
except for the 10th quantile where significance is weaker (p = 0.054). Adding benchmarks to rank 
feedback increases productivity by 13.1%, 13.0%, 12.4%, 16.1%, and 17.7% at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 
and 90th quantile. There is again no significant difference between any of these effects as reported at the 
foot of first panel. Replacing rank feedback with only giving benchmarks increases productivity solely at 
the 75th and the 90th percentile by respectively 11.4% and 12.4%, but the size of the treatment effect is the 
same for all quantiles as confirmed by tests at the bottom of the table.  
This study also confirms that gender differences are present in the quantile regressions. For 
women, removing rank feedback only increases productivity at the 50th quantile by 10.8% and at the 75th 
quantile by 10.2%. Adding benchmarks to rank feedback does not increase productivity at any quantile. 
Notably, taking away rank feedback and providing benchmarks increases productivity at the median 
(16.8%) and farther up by 14.9% (75th quantile) and 16% (90th quantile) even though significance hovers 
around the 5% level and these treatment effects are not different from those at lower quantiles as reported 
at the bottom of the panel. 
For men, I can again confirm prior results. The effect of not showing rank information is positive 
and precisely estimated at the 10th, 25, and 75th percentile, the p-value dropping to 0.102 for the 50th 
percentile. The effect is between 17-25% and several percentage points larger than for the full sample. 
Adding benchmarks to rank feedback is positive and precisely estimated except at the median. The effect 
30 
?
is stronger than for the full sample at 25-27%. Only providing benchmarks does not raise performance 
compared to rank feedback for men. 
Figures A1a-c provides a graphical representation of the results by plotting the estimates of 
???? ????? ? and ??? at every ? ? ??? ??, and the associated bootstrapped 90% confidence interval. This 
emphasizes that the pattern described above holds throughout the distribution of conditional productivity. 
In particular, the figure shows that: (i) ???? ????? ? ? and is flat for the full sample and for men, but not 
for women, (ii) I cannot reject ??? ? ? for the full sample and for men, (iii) ??? ? ? for women.  
The homogeneous treatment refutes the prediction that providing rank feedback will particularly 
dissuade those at the bottom of the distribution, as then I would have expected to see significant and 
positive effects only at lower quantiles. It also does not support the notion that rank feedback is essential 
to those at the top of the distribution, as that would have implied negative treatment effects of not 
showing rank at the top quantiles, which is not the case. Finally, the gender difference is notable: 
Rankings do not affect performance for women, but benchmarks alone do. This is consistent, among other 
mechanisms, with the notion that benchmarks are perceived to be a signal to women that relative 
performance matters to the principal and might be a preview of changes in the compensation system. It 
could also be that women find benchmarks alone more motivating than men.  
 
Further Evidence on Treatment Heterogeneity by Gender 
In the April 2012 online survey, I collected a set of characteristics and report summary statistics in Table 
1B. Indeed, it is apparent that even though men and women are not different in terms of sales-
performance, job and life satisfaction, and emotional stability, they differ significantly in terms of age, 
tenure, marital status, risk attitude, whether they provide their household’s principal income, extraversion, 
conscientiousness, and openness to experiences.  
In Table A3, I explore whether the treatment effects significantly vary across these characteristics 
and whether at the same time the heterogeneous treatment effects by gender remain significant. To read 
this table, note that at the top it is denoted which interaction terms are included: e.g. in column (1) age is 
added linearly and as interaction terms in addition to the gender effects, in column (2) it includes marital 
status, etc.  
These samples do not provide enough statistical power to separately estimate all coefficients. 
Instead, the key statistics of interest are at the bottom of the table where joint tests for treatment 
heterogeneity were performed for each additional characteristic to show whether the gender effects 
remain jointly significant. For example in column (1), I test jointly  
 
??? age = 0, age*(Nor Rank Feedback) = 0, age*(Rank & Benchmarks) = 0, age*Benchmarks = 0 
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which has an F-statistic of 3.824 with an associated p-value of 0.00194. The same process is followed 
across the columns.  
Two results emerge. First, in addition to the gender effects, I find treatment heterogeneity 
(significant at the 5% level) by age, life and job satisfaction. Second, even after controlling for these 
additional characteristics, the gender effects remain jointly significant.  
This exercise gives additional support to the results in Table 3 that the results are gender specific.   
Table	  1	  -­‐	  Summary	  Statistics:	  Balancing	  Tests	  and	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  Observable	  Characteristics
Table	  1A	  -­‐	  Balancing	  tests
F-­‐test	  (and	  p-­‐values)	  of	  joint	  significance	  for	  treatment	  dummies	  2009-­‐2011
year(s) 2009 2010 2011 2009-­‐2011
pre-­‐treatment	  log(furniture	  sales) 0.26 2.12 0.13 0.57
(0.7678) (0.1208) (0.8739) (0.7547)
Female	  (fraction) 0.92 0.44 0.13 0.82
(0.4001) (0.6417) (0.8812) (0.5575)
Table	  1B	  -­‐	  Gender	  Differences	  in	  Observable	  characterstics	  overall	  and	  by	  gender
All Men Women Test	  for	  differences	  in	  means	  by	  gender	  
(std.	  dev.) (std.	  dev.) (std.	  dev.) (p-­‐values)
log(monthly	  sales) 8.522 8.561 8.492 0.1367
2009-­‐2011 (0.960) (0.993) (0.933)
Female	  (fraction) 0.570
(0.495)
Tenure 1745.08 1855.94 1661.48 0.0138**
(1089.78) (1080.63) (1088.67)
Age 48.2 50.04 46.76 0.0000***
(10.07) (9.972) (9.924)
Single 0.113 0.059 0.155 0.0000***
(ommitted	  cat:	  married	  and	  divorced/separated) (0.317) (0.236) (0.362)
Divorced/Separated 0.088 0.053 0.116 0.0024***
(ommitted	  cat:	  single	  and	  divorced/separated) (0.284) (0.225) (0.321)
Risk	  Attitude 8.289 8.471 8.144 0.0131***
(see	  Notes) (1.814) (1.757) (1.849)
Job	  Dissatisfaction 1.948 1.906 1.984 0.2906
(1.014) (0.9941) (1.030)
Lifes	  Dissatisfaction 1.558 1.55 1.567 0.7832
(0.7561) (0.749) (0.763)
Household's	  main	  income	  source 0.6169 0.719 0.537 0.0000***
(0.4865) (0.451) (0.499)
Big	  Five
Extraversion 5.496 5.296 5.655 0.0001***
(1.252) (1.256) (1.288)
Agreeableness 5.427 5.246 5.570 0.0000***
(1.069) (1.049) (1.065)
Conscientiousness 6.147 6.048 6.223 0.0081***
(0.910) (0.928) (0.890)
Emotional	  Stability 5.541 5.55 5.534 0.8429
(1.130) (1.102) (1.131)
Openness	  to	  Experiences 5.881 5.747 5.986 0.0003***
(0.909) (0.913) (0.893)
Note:	  Table	  1B	  reports	  joint	  F-­‐tests	  to	  test	  for	  balance	  across	  the	  treatment	  groups	  with	  the	  associated	  p-­‐values	  in	  parantheses.	  The	  dependent	  
variable	  is	  collapsed	  at	  the	  salesperson	  level	  and	  is	  then	  regressed	  on	  a	  set	  of	  dummy	  variables	  indicating	  what	  treatment	  that	  salesperson	  has	  
been	  in	  for	  each	  of	  the	  treatment	  years	  2009	  to	  2011	  seperately	  and	  in	  the	  last	  column	  across	  all	  three	  years.	  Risk	  Aversion	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
answer	  to	  the	  question	  "Are	  you	  generally	  a	  person	  who	  is	  fully	  prepared	  to	  take	  risks	  or	  do	  you	  try	  to	  avoid	  taking	  risks?	  Please	  choose	  a	  
number	  from	  0	  to	  10	  where	  0	  means:	  “not	  prepared	  to	  take	  risks”	  and	  the	  value	  10	  means:	  “fully	  prepared	  to	  take	  risks.”	  See	  Dohmen	  et	  al	  
(JEEA,	  2011)	  for	  a	  validation	  of	  this	  instrument	  where	  the	  mean	  (median)	  in	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  Germany	  is	  4.42	  (5).
Table	  2 Natural	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  -­‐	  means	  and	  differences	  in	  means	  by	  treatment	  groups
Table	  2A All	  salespeople
Rank No	  Rank Differences	  in	  means
mean	  (std.	  dev.) mean	  (std.	  dev.) (robust	  standard	  errors)
[1] [2] [2]-­‐[1]	  =
No	  Benchmarks mean 8.577 8.778 0.201***
(std.	  dev.) (1.021) (0.9494) (0.053)
[3] [4] [4]-­‐[3]	  =
Benchmarks mean 8.852 8.869 0.017
(std.	  dev.) (0.967) (1.046) (0.064)
Differences [3]-­‐[2]	  = [3]-­‐[1]	  = [4]-­‐[2]	  = [4]-­‐[1]	  =
in	  means 0.075 0.276*** 0.091 0.292***
(robust	  std.	  err.) (0.050) (0.056) (0.062) (0.066)
Table	  2B Female	  salespeople
Rank No	  Rank Differences	  in	  means
mean	  (std.	  dev.) mean	  (std.	  dev.) (robust	  standard	  errors)
[1'] [2'] [2']-­‐[1']	  =
No	  Benchmarks mean 8.530 8.696 0.166***
(std.	  dev.) (0.999) (0.932) (0.068)
[3'] [4'] [4']-­‐[3']	  =
Benchmarks mean 8.756 8.879 0.123
(std.	  dev.) (0.905) (1.017) (0.083)
Differences [3']-­‐[2']	  = [3']-­‐[1']	  = [4']-­‐[2']	  = [4']-­‐[1']	  =
in	  means 0.059 0.226*** 0.182** 0.349***
(robust	  std.	  err.) (0.064) (0.070) (0.081) (0.086)
Table	  2C Male	  salespeople
Rank No	  Rank Differences	  in	  means
mean	  (std.	  dev.) mean	  (std.	  dev.) (robust	  standard	  errors)
[1''] [2''] [2'']-­‐[1'']	  =
No	  Benchmarks mean 8.638 8.880 0.242***
(std.	  dev.) (1.048) (0.962) (0.084)
[3''] [4''] [4'']-­‐[3'']	  =
Benchmarks mean 8.972 8.858 -­‐0.114
(std.	  dev.) (1.028) (1.081) (0.099)
Differences [3'']-­‐[2'']	  = [3'']-­‐[1'']	  = [4'']-­‐[2'']	  = [4'']-­‐[1'']	  =
in	  means 0.092 0.333*** -­‐0.022 0.220**
(robust	  std.	  err.) (0.079) (0.089) (0.095) (0.103)
Treatments
Treatments
Treatments
Note:	  Tables	  contain	  weighted	  averages	  of	  the	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  by	  treatment	  where	  the	  weights	  are	  the	  number	  of	  months	  
a	  salesperson	  in	  a	  treatment	  had	  sales	  between	  August	  2009,	  the	  start	  of	  the	  experiment,	  to	  2011.	  The	  edges	  of	  the	  tables	  
report	  tests	  of	  differences	  in	  means	  between	  treatment	  groups	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parantheses.	  Salespeople	  in	  the	  
"Rank"	  treatment	  could	  see	  their	  rank	  in	  terms	  of	  year-­‐to-­‐date	  sales	  in	  North	  America	  on	  their	  personalized	  web-­‐report.	  
Salespeople	  in	  the	  "Benchmark"	  treatment	  saw	  the	  year-­‐to-­‐date	  sales	  in	  North	  America	  required	  on	  a	  given	  day	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
top	  10%,	  25%,	  and	  50%.	  Web-­‐reports	  were	  updated	  daily.
Table	  3:	  Main	  and	  Gender	  Specific	  Treatment	  Effects	  on	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  by	  salesperson
Dependent	  Variable:	  Log	  or	  monthly	  sales
Ommitted	  category:	  Rank	  Feedback
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
09-­‐11:	  Main	  Effect 09-­‐11:	  by	  Gender 09-­‐11:	  Diff-­‐in-­‐Diff 2009:	  Main	  Effect 2009:	  by	  Gender 2010:	  Main	  Effect 2010:	  by	  Gender 2011:	  Main	  Effect 2011:	  by	  Gender
Ommitted	  category:	   Rank	  Feedback Rank	  Feedback Rank	  Feedback Rank	  Feedback Rank	  Feedback Rank	  Feedback Rank	  Feedback No	  Rank	  Feedback No	  Rank	  Feedback
No	  Rank	  Feedback 0.109** 0.160** 0.117** 0.150* 0.328*** 0.148** 0.173*
(0.0529) (0.0723) (0.0527) (0.0765) (0.117) (0.0668) (0.104)
Female*(No	  Rank	  Feedback) -­‐0.0965 -­‐0.1470** -­‐0.306** -­‐0.0508
(0.0766) (0.0657) (0.132) (0.136)
Gender:	  Female -­‐0.0885 (omitted) -­‐0.0895 -­‐0.0900 -­‐0.171*
(0.0579) (0.0606) (0.0981) (0.0949)
Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks 0.125** 0.203*** 0.0499 0.113* 0.168 0.0532 0.114
(0.0582) (0.0779) (0.0611) (0.0676) (0.108) (0.0685) (0.107)
Female*(Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks) -­‐0.149* -­‐0.0381 -­‐0.108 -­‐0.110
(0.0820) (0.0709) (0.137) (0.138)
Benchmarks	  only 0.0637 0.00975 0.0247 -­‐0.0280 -­‐0.123
(0.0777) (0.0996) (0.0832) (0.0702) (0.107)
Female*(Benchmarks	  only) 0.0911 0.0597 0.171
(0.102) (0.0896) (0.142)
Marginal	  treatment	  effects	  for	  female	  salespeople
No	  Rank	  Feedback	  (women) 0.0633 -­‐0.0299 0.0216 0.123
(0.0585) (0.0484) (0.0850) (0.0864)
Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks	  (women) 0.0544 0.0117 0.0597 0.00462
(0.0641) (0.0546) (0.0844) (0.0872)
Benchmarks	  only	  (women) 0.101 0.0844 0.0480
(0.0868) (0.0723) (0.0926)
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared 0.0455 0.0483 0.2553 0.0393 0.0430 0.0210 0.0229 0.0309 0.0342
Month-­‐year	  fixed	  effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Salespeople	  fixed	  effects no no yes no no no no no no
Number	  of	  salespeople	  (clusters) 1754 1754 1754 960 960 1285 1285 1434 1434
Number	  of	  observations 29722 29722 29722 7780 7780 10360 10360 11063 11063
Note:	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  clustered	  at	  the	  salesperson	  level.	  p	  <	  0.10	  (*),	  p	  <	  0.05	  (**),	  p	  <	  0.01	  (***).	  Rank	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  year-­‐to-­‐date	  sales	  in	  North	  America.	  "No	  Rank	  Feeback"	  provides	  neither	  
rank	  nor	  benchmarks,	  Benchmarks	  is	  the	  treatment	  where	  we	  showed	  salespeople	  what	  it	  currently	  takes	  to	  be	  in	  the	  top	  10%,	  25%,	  and	  50%	  in	  North	  America.
Table	  4:	  Good	  versus	  Bad	  News	  -­‐	  All	  products	  and	  by	  low	  and	  high	  effort	  substitution	  products
Ommitted	  category:	  Rank	  Feedback
Dependent	  variable
baseline Good	  vs	  Bad	  News baseline Good	  vs	  Bad	  News baseline Good	  vs	  Bad	  News
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No	  Rank	  Feedback 0.1250** -­‐0.027 0.0754 -­‐0.0625 0.1440** -­‐0.0417
(0.0629) (0.0941) (0.0645) (0.1004) (0.0693) (0.0998)
Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks 0.1370** 0.0622 0.0992 -­‐0.0454 0.1617 0.0687
(0.0633) (0.0956) (0.0642) (0.1047) (0.0712) (0.0987)
Benchmarks	  only 0.0779 -­‐0.0691 0.0864 -­‐0.0559 0.1268 -­‐0.0566
(0.0841) (0.1170) (0.0847) (0.1184) (0.0949) (0.1247)
(No	  Rank	  Feedback)*(Bad	  News) 0.2846** 0.2133* 0.2866**
(0.0941) (0.1169) (0.1206)
(Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks)*(Bad	  News) 0.1848 0.0992 0.1547
(0.1148) (0.1277) (0.1220)
(Benchmarks	  only)*(Bad	  News) 0.3603*** 0.3012** 0.3240**
(0.1374) (0.1423) (0.1560)
-­‐0.8301*** -­‐0.6610*** -­‐0.7353***
(0.0901) (0.1095) (0.0985)
Month-­‐year	  fixed	  effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared 0.0339 0.0647 0.0145 0.0369 0.0121 0.0353
Number	  of	  salespeople	  (clusters) 1623 1341 1508 1243 1502 1233
Number	  of	  observations 21942 18097 16740 14020 16945 14160
log(monthly	  sales)	  of	  those	  furniture	  
products	  with	  LOW	  effort	  
substitution	  across	  brands
log(monthly	  sales)	  of	  those	  
furniture	  products	  with	  HIGH	  
effort	  substitution	  across	  brands
log(monthly	  sales)	  on	  all	  
products
Note:	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  clustered	  at	  the	  salesperson	  level.	  p	  <	  0.10	  (*),	  p	  <	  0.05	  (**),	  p	  ,	  0.01	  (***).	  'Bad	  News'	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  
to	  one	  when	  the	  rank	  in	  the	  current	  month	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  rank	  in	  the	  prior	  year.	  The	  sample	  is	  therefore	  restricted	  to	  years	  2010	  &	  2011.	  The	  
dependent	  variable	  in	  columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  is	  the	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales;	  in	  columns	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  it	  is	  the	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  on	  those	  products	  that	  are	  
subject	  to	  low	  effort	  substitution	  with	  products	  by	  other	  brands;	  in	  column	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  it	  is	  the	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  on	  those	  products	  that	  are	  subject	  
to	  high	  effort	  substitution	  with	  products	  by	  other	  brands.	  Rank	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  year-­‐to-­‐date	  sales	  in	  North	  America.	  The	  ommitted	  treatment	  is	  
with	  Rank	  Feedback;	  No	  Rank	  Feeback	  provides	  neither	  rank	  nor	  benchmarks,	  Benchmarks	  is	  the	  treatment	  where	  we	  showed	  salespeople	  what	  it	  
currently	  takes	  to	  be	  in	  the	  top	  10%,	  25%,	  and	  50%	  in	  North	  America.
Bad	  News	  (=1	  when	  current	  rank	  lower	  than	  
at	  end	  of	  prior	  year)
?????????????? ????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
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Figure 1 - Average monthly sales by treatment: all salespeople
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Figure 2 - Average monthly sales by treatment: female salespeople
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Figure 3 - Average monthly sales by treatment: male salespeople
 
Table	  A1 Natural	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  -­‐	  means	  and	  differences	  in	  means	  by	  year	  and	  treatment	  groups
Table	  A1b All	  salespeople
No	  Rank Differences	  in	  means
mean	  (std.	  dev.) (robust	  standard	  errors)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [3]-­‐[1]= [4]-­‐[2]=
year Aug-­‐Dec	  2009 2010 Aug-­‐Dec	  2009 2010 2011 Aug-­‐Dec	  09 2010
mean 8.403 8.681 8.566 8.834 8.866 0.1637* 0.1535**
(std.	  dev.) (1.2743) (0.9252) (1.124) (0.927) (0.987) (0.093) (0.068)
[6] [7] [8] [8]-­‐[7]=
year 2010 2011 2011 2011
mean 8.801 8.937 8.844 -­‐0.093
(std.	  dev.) (0.9321) (1.027) (1.072) (0.073)
[6]-­‐[4]= [7]-­‐[5]= [6]-­‐[2]= [8]-­‐[5]=
year 2010 2011 2010 2011
Diff.	  in	  means -­‐0.033 0.071 0.1203* -­‐0.0219
(robust	  std.	  err.) (0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.072)
Table	  A1c Female	  salespeople
No	  Rank Differences	  in	  means
mean	  (std.	  dev.) (robust	  standard	  errors)
[1'] [2'] [3'] [4'] [5'] [3']-­‐[1']= [4']-­‐[2']=
year Aug-­‐Dec	  2009 2010 Aug-­‐Dec	  2009 2010 2011 Aug-­‐Dec	  09 2010
mean 8.320 8.640 8.404 8.769 8.787 0.084 0.129
(std.	  dev.) (1.307) (0.864) (1.045) (0.927) (0.972) (0.122) (0.087)
[6'] [7'] [8'] [8']-­‐[7']=
year 2010 2011 2011 2011
mean 8.709 8.809 8.850 0.042
(std.	  dev.) (0.872) (0.945) (1.041) (0.093)
[6']-­‐[4']= [7']-­‐[5']= [6']-­‐[2']= [8']-­‐[5']=
year 2010 2011 2010 2011
Diff.	  in	  means -­‐0.060 0.021 0.069 0.063
(robust	  std.	  err.) (0.088) (0.089) (0.085) (0.095)
Table	  A1d Male	  Salespeople
No	  Rank Differences	  in	  means
mean	  (std.	  dev.) (robust	  standard	  errors)
[1''] [2''] [3''] [4''] [5''] [3'']-­‐[1'']= [4'']-­‐[2'']=
year Aug-­‐Dec	  2009 2010 Aug-­‐Dec	  2009 2010 2011 Aug-­‐Dec	  09 2010
mean 8.509 8.732 8.784 8.91 8.965 0.275* 0.178*
(std.	  dev.) (1.226) (0.996) (1.192) (0.923) (1.000) (0.143) (0.106)
[6''] [7''] [8''] [8'']-­‐[7'']=
year 2010 2011 2011 -­‐0.260**
mean 8.905 9.097 8.837 (0.115)
(std.	  dev.) (0.987) (1.103) (1.041)
[6'']-­‐[4'']= [7'']-­‐[5'']= [6'']-­‐[2'']= [8'']-­‐[5'']=
year 2010 2011 2010 2011
Diff.	  in	  means -­‐0.005 0.132 0.172 -­‐0.128
(robust	  std.	  err.) (0.103) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110)
Rank
mean	  (std.	  dev.)
Note:	  Tables	  contain	  weighted	  averages	  of	  the	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales	  by	  treatment	  and	  year	  where	  the	  weights	  are	  the	  number	  of	  months	  a	  salesperson	  in	  a	  treatment	  had	  sales	  in	  the	  years	  2009	  
to	  2011.	  The	  edges	  of	  the	  tables	  report	  tests	  of	  differences	  in	  means	  between	  treatment	  groups	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parantheses.	  Salespeople	  in	  the	  "Rank"	  treatment	  could	  see	  their	  
rank	  in	  terms	  of	  year-­‐to-­‐date	  sales	  in	  North	  America	  on	  their	  personalized	  web-­‐report.	  Salespeople	  in	  the	  "Benchmark"	  treatment	  saw	  the	  year-­‐to-­‐date	  sales	  in	  North	  America	  required	  on	  a	  
given	  day	  to	  be	  in	  the	  top	  10%,	  25%,	  and	  50%.	  Web-­‐reports	  were	  updated	  daily.	  The	  "year"	  rows	  shows	  which	  treatments	  were	  in	  place	  in	  a	  what	  year.	  Salespeople	  were	  randomly	  allocated	  to	  
treatment	  groups	  in	  August	  2009,	  January	  2010,	  and	  January	  2011	  and	  the	  randomization	  occured	  for	  all	  salespeople	  at	  each	  of	  these	  dates	  so	  that	  treatment	  groups	  memberships	  were	  
uncorrelated	  across	  year.	  
No	  Benchmarks
No	  Benchmarks
Benchmarks
Benchmarks
Treatments
Treatments
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mean	  (std.	  dev.)
No	  Benchmarks
Benchmarks
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mean	  (std.	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Table	  A2:	  Main	  and	  Gender	  Specific	  Quantile	  Treatment	  Effects
Dependent	  Variable:	  log	  of	  sales	  by	  month	  and	  salesperson
Ommitted	  category:	  Rank	  Feedback
All	  Salespeople (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
No	  Rank	  Feedback 0.159** 0.141*** 0.121*** 0.152*** 0.0709
(0.0622) (0.0489) (0.0387) (0.0368) (0.0442)
Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks 0.131* 0.130** 0.124*** 0.161*** 0.177***
(0.0683) (0.0518) (0.0395) (0.0368) (0.0485)
Benchmarks	  only 0.114 0.0727 0.0558 0.114** 0.124**
(0.0800) (0.0615) (0.0490) (0.0524) (0.0588)
Period	  fixed	  effects yes yes yes yes yes
N 29722 29722 29722 29722 29722
Female	  Salespeople
Quantile q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
No	  Rank	  Feedback 0.0983 0.0813 0.108** 0.102* 0.0317
(0.0770) (0.0628) (0.0532) (0.0521) (0.0571)
Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks 0.0750 0.0493 0.0769 0.0745 0.0618
(0.0846) (0.0672) (0.0594) (0.0542) (0.0664)
Benchmarks	  only 0.147 0.0719 0.168** 0.149** 0.160**
(0.105) (0.0871) (0.0740) (0.0760) (0.0791)
Period	  fixed	  effects yes yes yes yes yes
N 16177 16177 16177 16177 16177
Male	  Salespeople
Quantile q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
No	  Rank	  Feedback 0.249** 0.196*** 0.105 0.171*** 0.0429
(0.0979) (0.0739) (0.0643) (0.0597) (0.0679)
Rank	  Feedback	  &	  Benchmarks 0.256** 0.251*** 0.132* 0.266*** 0.245***
(0.0994) (0.0803) (0.0681) (0.0652) (0.0746)
Benchmarks	  only 0.125 0.0234 -­‐0.135* 0.0465 0.0298
(0.131) (0.100) (0.0817) (0.0835) (0.0921)
Period	  fixed	  effects yes yes yes yes yes
N 13545 13545 13545 13545 13545
Note:	  Quantile	  regressions	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  based	  on	  5000	  replications.
Table	  A3	  Treatment	  Effects	  by	  Observable	  Charactersistics
Dependent	  Variable:	  Log	  or	  monthly	  sales
Ommitted	  category:	  Rank	  Feedback
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Interaction	  variable	  (INTVAR) Age Single Divorced Risk	  Attitudes Main	  Household	  Income	  SourceJob-­‐Dissatisfaction Life-­‐Dissatisfaction Extravertedness Agreeableness Conscientiousness
No	  Rank	  Feedback 0.379* 0.150 0.161 -­‐0.0534 0.213* 0.129 0.0788 -­‐0.0164 0.483* -­‐0.0861 0.0736 0.208
(0.229) (0.102) (0.102) (0.266) (0.122) (0.150) (0.149) (0.264) (0.291) (0.377) (0.260) (0.336)
Rank	  &	  Benchmarks 0.779*** 0.238** 0.250** 0.442* 0.331** 0.251 0.175 0.159 0.570* -­‐0.330 0.625** 0.321
(0.272) (0.111) (0.111) (0.264) (0.135) (0.158) (0.161) (0.257) (0.304) (0.418) (0.273) (0.361)
Benchmarks 0.384 -­‐0.106 -­‐0.0894 -­‐0.537 -­‐0.231 -­‐0.215 -­‐0.275 -­‐0.599* -­‐0.179 -­‐0.406 0.00877 -­‐0.593
(0.311) (0.141) (0.140) (0.350) (0.160) (0.190) (0.193) (0.329) (0.400) (0.502) (0.393) (0.485)
Female*(No	  Rank	  Feedback) -­‐0.131 -­‐0.148 -­‐0.150 -­‐0.145 -­‐0.163 -­‐0.163 -­‐0.153 -­‐0.158 -­‐0.132 -­‐0.153 -­‐0.150 -­‐0.148
(0.0909) (0.106) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.106) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Female*(Rank	  &	  Benchmarks) -­‐0.166* -­‐0.191* -­‐0.214* -­‐0.225** -­‐0.236** -­‐0.212* -­‐0.227** -­‐0.217* -­‐0.186* -­‐0.239** -­‐0.219* -­‐0.213*
(0.0998) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) (0.115) (0.113) (0.114)
Female*Benchmarks 0.151 0.168 0.141 0.237* 0.195 0.190 0.191 0.134 0.184 0.162 0.186 0.171
(0.120) (0.143) (0.143) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141) (0.145) (0.141) (0.145) (0.141) (0.145)
Female -­‐0.110 -­‐0.0549 -­‐0.0780 -­‐0.0589 -­‐0.0548 -­‐0.0690 -­‐0.0712 -­‐0.0847 -­‐0.0695 -­‐0.0778 -­‐0.0688 -­‐0.0748
(0.0720) (0.0811) (0.0820) (0.0812) (0.0816) (0.0808) (0.0801) (0.0799) (0.0800) (0.0812) (0.0814) (0.0813)
Interaction	  Variable	  (INTVAR) -­‐0.00240 -­‐0.264** 0.0588 0.0339 0.0881 -­‐0.102*** -­‐0.176*** 0.0334 -­‐0.00745 0.0346 0.0459 0.0132
(0.00359) (0.116) (0.133) (0.0224) (0.0829) (0.0390) (0.0588) (0.0351) (0.0394) (0.0499) (0.0344) (0.0438)
INTVAR*(Nor	  Rank	  Feedback) -­‐0.00407 0.0756 0.0271 0.0257 -­‐0.0659 0.0188 0.0594 0.0327 -­‐0.0621 0.0398 0.0159 -­‐0.00821
(0.00450) (0.145) (0.176) (0.0295) (0.103) (0.0554) (0.0723) (0.0437) (0.0515) (0.0599) (0.0429) (0.0547)
INTVAR*(Rank	  &	  Benchmarks) -­‐0.0118** -­‐0.103 0.0222 -­‐0.0217 -­‐0.105 0.00193 0.0618 0.0174 -­‐0.0632 0.0962 -­‐0.0672 -­‐0.0121
(0.00508) (0.184) (0.186) (0.0291) (0.113) (0.0545) (0.0705) (0.0445) (0.0523) (0.0667) (0.0446) (0.0592)
INTVAR*Benchmarks -­‐0.00826 0.169 0.287 0.0517 0.232* 0.0700 0.127 0.0993* 0.0163 0.0538 -­‐0.0167 0.0873
(0.00590) (0.212) (0.219) (0.0382) (0.137) (0.0651) (0.104) (0.0583) (0.0685) (0.0811) (0.0668) (0.0815)
Joint	  test	  H0:	  INTVAR=0,	  INTVAR*(Nor	  Rank	  Feedback)=0,	  INTVAR*(Rank	  &	  Benchmarks)=0,	  INTVAR*Benchmarks=0
F-­‐statistic 3.824** 2.085* 0.533 1.869* 1.221 3.918*** 3.553*** 1.619 1.373 1.492 1.012 0.302
p-­‐value 0.00194 0.0653 0.751 0.0975 0.297 0.00163 0.00349 0.152 0.232 0.190 0.409 0.912
Joint	  test	  H0:	  Female=0,	  Female*(Nor	  Rank	  Feedback)=0,	  Female*(Rank	  &	  Benchmarks)=0,	  Female*Benchmarks=0
F-­‐statistic 3.480*** 2.216* 2.667** 2.819** 2.845** 2.925** 2.938** 2.787** 2.367** 2.995** 2.758** 2.701**
p-­‐value 0.00399 0.0510 0.0212 0.0156 0.0148 0.0126 0.0123 0.0167 0.0381 0.0110 0.0177 0.0198
Adjusted	  r-­‐squared 0.0457 0.0463 0.0448 0.0471 0.0457 0.0475 0.0474 0.0468 0.0457 0.0465 0.0452 0.0446
Number	  of	  salespeople	  (clusters) 1043 770 770 771 770 771 771 771 771 771 771 771
Number	  of	  observations 21430 16508 16508 16530 16508 16530 16530 16530 16530 16530 16530 16530
Notes:	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parantheses,	  *	  p<0.10,	  **	  p<0.05,	  ***	  p<0.01.	  Errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  salesperson	  level.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  in	  all	  regressions	  is	  the	  log	  of	  monthly	  sales.	  Each	  column	  uses	  a	  difference	  variables	  as	  interaction	  terms.	  In	  column	  (1)	  
the	  interaction	  variable	  is	  gender,	  in	  column	  (2)	  it	  is	  age,	  etc.	  The	  regression	  also	  includes	  a	  constant	  and	  a	  dummy	  for	  a	  treament	  only	  used	  during	  the	  pilot	  phase	  in	  2009	  where	  we	  provided	  normalized	  rank	  feedback	  in	  one	  treatment	  arm.	  See	  Table	  1	  for	  
definition	  of	  variables
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